

Building a Spiritual Civilization in China

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*I*t is not uncommon these days to hear biting criticism of Chinese society in such graphic language as "socially chaotic", "ideologically disordered", "ethically bankrupt", or more disquieting still "a soulless society living in a moral vacuum". Even among China's top government officials and mass-media pundits there is little hesitation in acknowledging in public the existence of the darker side of life on the mainland. This from the Xinhua News Agency: "The disappearance of social norms, the demise of public morality, and the disintegration of traditional values have brought us to the present moral crisis." Nor did anyone lift an eyebrow in surprise when a noted research sociologist recently commented: "A spiritual emptiness and a loss of psychological well-being are diseases that are now commonly found among the present generation; they are the enemies of human nature's highest aspirations."¹ Last September President Jiang Zemin himself, in a speech to the CCP's Central Committee, emphasized the need to take drastic steps to remedy an obviously deteriorating situation: "The implementation of the 1995 Planning Scheme and the adoption of the 2010 long-range objectives should serve to raise to a higher priority level the need for building the Socialist Spiritual Civilization".²



The aim of this paper is to offer a brief description of the various dimensions of the present 'moral crisis', to indicate counter-measures taken by the government to Build up the Socialist Spiritual Civilization, (from now on referred to as BSSC) and, finally, to give some suggestions on how to go about assessing objectively their results to date.

The Present Moral Crisis

Even at a distance we can see that the present 'moral crisis' in China presents a multifaceted and complex picture. But two major points of focus are helpful in clarifying the issues involved; namely, its effect on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and on the masses, i.e., the great body of the common people.

Among Party members all moral evil seems to be summed up by the two phrases "bureaucratic corruption" and its euphemism "unhealthy tendencies". "Corruption in the government is everywhere" is the most common complaint on everyone's lips in China these days. For the cadres, "bribery is not just one way but the only way," not "the exceptional but endemic in daily life and culture."

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Corrupt practices engaged in by cadres that have been officially openly denounced by both government and the mass media makes for quite a long list: bribery, graft, embezzlement,³ tax evasion, and extortion; *guanshang bufen*, using public office for private gain, which leads to the loss of personal pride in one's work, worship of money,⁴ bureaucracy, nepotism and favoritism; collusion with criminal elements for personal advantage, falsification and misrepresentation of official reports, extravagant and prodigal lifestyles with the worship of money overriding all other values and concerns. The *People's Daily* recently quoted a saying now making the rounds of the system's critics: "A cadre creates figures, but a superior cadre creates false figures." The editor went on to comment further: "If you are in the habit of not telling the truth, or of blowing your own horn, or hoodwinking your boss by telling him all is well while covering up all that is not, and if you enjoy an ostentatious and extravagant lifestyle, as you squander away public funds, are you still regarded as a member in good standing of the Communist Party?"⁵

With regard to the masses, the "moral crisis" is described in somewhat broader terms, and takes on different manifestations. Leading the list is the present disposition of worshipping money as a god. Following Deng

Xiaoping's notorious exhortation "to get rich is glorious", the making and spending of money seems to be the one prevailing value that is shared in common by all the people. Many openly admit that they regard money as "the highest value in life" and as "almighty, a worthy object of deification, and the source of happiness." Not a few "caught under the spell of money have lost all sense of right and wrong". The present reform movement is characterized in common parlance as a condition in which "everyone is out to make a buck, and all stand ready to leap into the great commercial sea." Manifestations of this crisis include:

- The pursuit of riches which drives many unscrupulous people to espouse unlawful methods. While relatively few are involved in violent crime, the drug trade, prostitution or gambling, the new entrepreneurs, who are somewhat at a loss to explain their sudden financial success, are often suspected of engaging in such practices.
- A second manifestation of a "moral crisis" among the people is the advent of a spirit of extreme individualism, which has brought with it a loss of due respect for parents, teachers and the elderly, a proper concern for the family, and a decline in the kind of community spirit that respected common property and public facilities. The demise of filial piety is particularly noticeable and regrettable. The incidents of young people neglecting to support ageing parents, sometimes even robbing them of their life-savings and abandoning them, are becoming more and more frequent. When parents obtain a court order, their children are still reluctant to support them and often ignore the law.
- The loss of an ideological and moral value system is another clear manifestation of the presence of a 'moral crisis' among the people. It can be seen in the decline of social civility and good manners and the single-minded pursuit of personal comforts. But mainly it makes its present known to an even greater degree in what is commonly referred to as the "six evils": prostitution, pornography, kidnapping of women and children, gambling,⁶ drug addiction and superstitious practices, all of which are on the increase. A report by the State Council in 1989 noted: "The spread of prostitution...and pornography...from the more developed coastal areas to the rest of the country is a most shocking phenomenon."

The same report speaks of 260,000 arrests for gambling in the same 10 month period, and the rampant trade in women and children throughout the country, especially in the poorer provinces. More up-to-date figures

register over 260,000 drug addicts and 300,000 prostitutes nation-wide, with less than 1% undergoing rehabilitation.

Building a Socialist Civilisation

A quick glance at China's recent history will help us to understand how the present situation came to be and how, in the past, China sought to deal with the problem.

The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 in effect brought to an end the Cultural Revolution. The "decade of catastrophe", which had been characterised by an unremitting attack on all traditional Chinese values, had at first generated a certain moral enthusiasm, as Mao called upon the nation to return to the simple and selfless life-styles of the early days of revolution. But it soon degenerated into a bitter and cynical power struggle at the top, and in the countryside mindless chaos, as the idealistic young Red Guards became cynical, acting more like criminals, becoming thugs and bullies, robbing and killing without remorse, wrecking havoc on people and property wherever they went. Families were traumatized and split up, as children denounced parents and parents denounced each other.

It was no longer possible for one person to trust another. The majority of survivors, especially those in the large cities, were like the walking-wounded, left over from some dreadful field of battle, and even today they are referred to as 'the lost generation'. Formal education and social civility were branded as degenerate bourgeois practices; disorder reigned and chaos prevailed in every institution and work unit of society. Things had reached such a pass, especially within the CCP, that a Commission was set up at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in December of 1978 and given responsibility for healing wounds caused by past crimes and restoring order where the threat of chaos still prevailed.

Chairman Ye Jiangying, chairman of the National People's Congress, is credited with being the first to have the courage to face up in public to the awful heritage of the immediate past and to suggest as a remedy the building up of a Socialist Spiritual Civilization. While acknowledging the need for a solid economic and material foundation, he called for the raising of "the educational, scientific, cultural and health levels of the whole nation, fostering lofty revolutionary ideals and morals, and developing a rich and multifaceted cultural life."⁷

From then on, this same concern has been taken up by other top officials who have widened its scope to include not only members of the army and the Party, but also the Chinese masses. Gradually two main sectors of society were marked out for special concern; namely, the Communist Party, which sought to maintain its prestige and the people's confidence, and the Chinese masses, who needed a solid education in socialist values to go along with the government's liberalization policies.

The goals of the BSSC were reiterated by Deng Xiaoping in December 1980: an advanced socialist society should aim at a close adherence to communist ideals, morals and discipline, and at the rejection of feudal, bourgeois and venal capitalist influences through constant criticism and improved laws and regulations.⁸

Early 1981 saw the beginning of the movement to "foster socialist decorum among the people, with the establishment of March as "Socialist Ethics Month". The aims of the campaign were summarized in the slogan "the five stresses and the four points of beauty": to educate the people to foster sound ideology and morality; to cultivate love of the motherland and the collective; to uphold Party leadership and the socialist system; to carry forward the spirit of mutual help and co-operation, to work and study with diligence, and to be honest and useful in serving the people.⁹

In the meantime, along with the economic reforms and the further opening of China to the outside world came increased occasions for more abuses, especially by cadres and members of the CCP. The conservatives took advantage of this to drum up opposition, blaming all the evils on the reforms and the influence of Western capitalism. A compromise was reached and a campaign against "unhealthy tendencies" was launched in August 1981. In April 1982, Deng declared in a debate on dealing with economic crime that the BSSC was itself an essential guarantee that China would remain faithful to the socialist road. Hu Yaobang elaborated on this in September of 1982 while serving as Secretary of the 11th Plenum of the CCP when he stated: "Both the material and spiritual civilization are indispensable to each other... BSSC is a task for the whole Party and the common task of people in all fields of endeavour. Ideological education in the Party is the main pillar for improving culture and ideology in the whole of society, and Party members should, first of all, play an exemplary role ideologically and morally... It is necessary to organize a mighty contingent of militant ideological workers able to persuade and act as a magnet for others."¹⁰

During the second half of 1983 the authorities passed a series of strong measures indicating that they had run out of patience and were now resorting to severe punishment as the only means to gain success in the war against crime. In August a campaign was launched that dealt severely with offenders and popularized group executions which were carried out in public in all major cities.¹¹ In October further efforts to reform the CCP were concentrated in the Campaign for the Rectification and Consolidation of the Party.¹² And towards the end of the same month the authorities undertook, in a broader ideological context, the Campaign Against Spiritual Pollution, which seemed on the verge of getting out of control and becoming a major struggle against liberal intellectuals had not the State Council intervened and restored order by setting clear limits.

Despite government initiatives, the general situation only worsened because of the increasing number of opportunities for corruption now available to the cadres on every level. Dire consequences were predicted if the trend continued; by 1984 top government authorities had already begun to talk about the urgent need to tackle the "crisis of confidence" spreading among the masses at an alarming rate because of corruption within the Party. In November of 1984 the National Party Conference adopted a two pronged policy. While reconfirming economic liberalization and the open door, it advocated the adoption of stricter controls over economic abuses and the inroads of bourgeois ideology.

At the beginning of 1986, the CCP focused its attention on the "work styles" of its members. A new ad hoc committee attacked extravagance, and several cases of obvious misconduct were singled out and dealt with severely. When the Sixth Plenum of the 12th Central Committee convened, it gave its unqualified approval to the proposed Resolution on the Guiding Principles for Building a Socialist Spiritual Civilization.¹³ This showed how far the BSSC concept had come within the Party and what a major influence it had on its thinking.

The Resolution underlined the following points of emphasis: it should be guided by Marxist principles; be grounded in the practical experience of material progress; adapt itself to the needs of socialist modernization; form patriotic citizens with socialist ideals, morality, culture and discipline; and uplift the ideological and moral qualities, the scientific and cultural levels of the entire Chinese nation. It must also enlist all ethnic groups in a common cause and unite them under a common ideal to build up "a socialism with Chinese characteristics that can transform the nation

into a modern socialist country with a high degree of civilization and democracy." The Resolution also criticized such abuses as nepotism and bureaucracy. While agreeing that reform should be gradual and nationwide, it must submit to ideological purity and the guidance of the CCP.¹⁴

The situation, however, did not improve. Official reports condemning corruption and other social evils continued unabated long after the Rectification and Consolidation Campaign ended in May of 1987.

Meanwhile, the student demonstrations of 1985 and 1986 played into the hands of the conservatives, who used them to launch a full scale campaign against 'Bourgeois Liberalization' and 'Westernization'. Hu Yaobang became the scapegoat and was forced to resign in January 1987.

A compromise was then reached with the progressive faction. Economic development would be restored as the nation's primary goal, the open door and reform policies could continue, but they would be supported by a firm commitment to the Four Cardinal Principles. The 13th Plenum of the CCP in October 1987 effected another ideological compromise when Deng's formula of "building a socialism with Chinese characteristics" was adopted, along with the specification that China was still in the "primary stage of socialism".¹⁵

During the next two years, due to increased inflation, corruption, bureaucracy and the refusal to adopt democratic reforms, the CCP concerns were no longer considered relevant to life among urban masses, and it continued to lose popularity in the countryside as well. "Fewer and fewer people wish to be enrolled in the Party or in the Communist Youth League; and yet more and more people are joining religious groups... While the words of the CCP cadres in the villages now have little appeal, the response to religious leaders is overwhelming."¹⁶

All these social problems eventually contributed to the organized student demonstrations in the spring of 1989, which were set off by the death of Hu Yaobang and which quickly gained the support of people from all classes of society. The demonstrations raised such fears among the top government authorities that on June 4 they resorted to force and sent in armoured tanks to crush the demonstrators and drive them out of Tiananmen Square.

Purges reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution followed in the wake of the crackdown. Their purpose was to rid the Party not of its corrupt officials, but of those "anti-revolutionary criminals" who were seen as supporting the democratic movement. "Hostile foreign forces" were also

judged by the government to be partially to blame for setting off the "counter-revolutionary turmoil". This only served to sharpen criticism levelled at China from the West for what it felt to be a violation of human rights.

The government in initiating its Campaign Against the Six Evils admitted the gravity of the problem and made a great public display of burning pornographic materials, clearing the streets of prostitutes, and dealing out harsh sentences to drug dealers, kidnappers, corrupt businessmen and religious charlatans. Even Lei Feng, the super-hero of Maoist days was resurrected in March of 1990 as a role-model for personal abnegation and self-sacrifice. "Learning from the example of Lei Feng" in the past was offered as one way to counteract the wide-spread evils of the present.

While economists were drafting the eighth Five Year Plan, ideologues were readying blueprints for the building up of a "spiritual empire". At the BSSC national conference in November of 1990, Wang Renzhi spelled out a Five-Year Plan for establishing a Spiritual Civilization.¹⁷ Its foundation included patriotism, self-abnegation, and total dedication to the CCP.

To organize the masses around the construction of a spiritual civilization, the CCP launched an introductory campaign that aimed to turn 1 billion people into loyal Marxists. The goal of this ambitious educational movement was to inoculate the citizenry against the spread of "bourgeois-liberal values".

A central focus of the campaign was to restore and renew the 800,000 Communist cells that were at the heart of the Communist organization of the countryside. The major religions were also asked to get involved by the organizers of a national conference on religious work held in Beijing in December of 1990.

Despite these initiatives, the Party still failed to win back the confidence of the people. A circular from the Central Committee in June of 1991 admitted as much, when it stated that the Party still suffered from "the dual attacks from foreign based subversives from without, and anti-Party forces from within." Blame was placed on bourgeois-liberal cadres who had been allowed to penetrate the higher ranks, having been weakened by the Party's neglect of its own discipline and education. Fear of a "foreign conspiracy" intent on disrupting the "peaceful evolution of China's development" was also voiced. In November of 1991 government

authorities published their own Report on Human Rights, in an effort to diffuse mounting foreign criticism and dismay at its dismal human rights record.

In 1992 business was booming, due in part to Deng's well-publicized visit to the southern industrial region and his high praise for what was happening there. But he, among a host of others, also warned of the dangers of creeping corruption, stating that if the CCP were ever to disintegrate, it would not be as a result of foreign invasion or national destabilization from the outside, but rather by corruption from within. By the end of 1992 Jiang Zemin was calling for new directives to bolster an ideological assault on all social evils and to intensify the propagation of "patriotism, collectivism and socialism."

By 1993 legislation was passed forbidding cadres to engage or act as intermediaries in business enterprises, to speculate on the stock market, or grant preferences on contracts to relatives and friends. The Party set up a censorship board that was to pass on the orthodoxy of all material prepared for the mass media, insuring that it was free of anything that might be construed as having a "bad influence on the masses." In the summer of 1993 the government, while blaming much of the social evils on foreign influences, also lashed out against Westerners whom they criticized for perpetuating the old myth about the "Yellow Peril" being a world threat and menace.

The Party opened the new year of 1994 with further calls for ideological orthodoxy. Many of the old Marxist themes were revived, most of them directed at strengthening Party discipline and propaganda. Jiang Zemin reiterated earlier warnings against social evils, and he challenged the Party "to form a people of noble spirit and to lead not by words alone but by the example of good works."¹⁸ At the National People's Assembly in March, Li Peng warned that "the relationship between growth, reform and stability" must receive proper handling, and "a speedy and healthy development must be sustained through tougher political disciplines; control over dissenters must also be tightened; and better security measures must be adopted to prevent further infiltration of "hostile foreign forces". The summer brought with it a new campaign, whose purpose was to instil patriotism and socialist values in the masses, especially among the youth. This was followed by another which sought to "energize the people's spirit, further unity, restore their self-respect and pride." All during this period the battle against corruption continued to be

waged. And while the official press on occasion announced victory, in actual fact the reports proved to be premature as there were few signs of much success. Within the CCP, efforts to stamp out corruption reached an apex with the arrest of Chen Xitong, the Mayor of Beijing. He was charged with misappropriating public funds.

During the Fifth Plenum of the 14th Central Committee of the CCP meeting last September, Jiang Zemin gave the campaign for BSSC a new push forward. He called for immediate implementation of Deng's mandate to "build socialism with Chinese characteristics", using the Resolution of 1986 as a general guideline. The young were singled out for special attention. They were to receive an ethical and moral education in "the finest tradition of honesty in government" that would serve to "strengthen them in the struggle against corruption."¹⁹ The city of Zhangjiangang in Jiangsu was singled out as a paradigm for economic and spiritual achievement.²⁰ However, even after all this, the battle seemed far from over; in fact, it had just begun.

Towards an Objective Assessment

If the above analysis of the past and present battle for morality in China seems to paint a gloomy picture, and the war against corruption seems to have ended in defeat for the forces of righteousness, it is important to remember the dangers of generalizing. It is true that economic reforms have brought about wide-scale opportunities for dishonest practices, but such opportunities are still available only to a limited number, mostly Party cadres. The majority of the rural population remains untouched, and retains its traditional simple and honest ways. While migration to the big cities poses great social problems, the migrants, with a few exceptions, have not turned to lives of crime.

The Chinese officials have taken note of where corruption is more likely to take place and have targeted the cadre-class of the Party for major renewal and reform. This is also consistent with the history of the Communist government, which has always looked upon retention of the moral credibility of the Party in the eyes of the people as its first and foremost priority. At present the Party faces a "crisis of legitimacy". Modernization, it is argued, demands a stability that can only be provided by allowing the leadership of the CCP to continue unchallenged. The loss of ideological and moral values among the cadres is a major source of

worry among Party leaders. They see the "crisis of confidence" spreading among the masses and know that this does not bode well for the future. "The real crisis facing the ruling Party in China is one of legitimacy, not morality." ²¹

This is why the authorities expend much efforts on uprooting corruption within the Party. It also helps to explain how they view the present moral crisis, and why they are now promoting the BSSC with such urgent enthusiasm.

The moral and political correctness of Party members is a life and death issue for the CCP. Unfortunately, the means used to attack corruption seem to have little impact on the problem. Cadre work-teams empowered to discipline and punish fellow cadres whom they judge to be corrupt, often degenerate into vehicles for false accusations and resolving personal vendettas against political enemies. Thus corruption often breeds more corruption. ²²

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Official analysis of the moral crisis is usually simplistic and superficial, and too often it ends up in a search for scapegoats. This is bound to happen when the causes of corruption are laid at the doorstep of the Cultural Revolution and bourgeois-capitalist Westernization, and only lip service is paid to the effects of the pragmatic nature of economic reforms.

A recent issue of the *People's Daily* noted that "many people still denounce filial piety as a degenerate moral value, just as was done in the days of the Cultural Revolution... And those preoccupied with Western ideas see money as the only glue that can hold the family and other relationships together." ²³ On the other hand, the pragmatic nature of the reforms seems to receive little serious analysis as a major cause of the moral crisis. The material and psychological advantages and disadvantages that accrue to individuals and groups, together with the distinction between so called "normative" and "cognitive" cultures, between "social" and "moral" evils, have yet to be duly assessed.

As Ting Wai has written in an article which appeared in the *China Review* last year: "The paramount leader has succeeded in orienting China towards an ambitious modernization programme, since it suits the wishes of the people, but he has not brought an ideology to the nation." He

criticizes Deng's thinking on the grounds that it "does not give a clear idea of what should or should not be done in achieving the goals." What is right and what is wrong is left in abeyance, and a strong ideological component is lacking. He argues that while Deng "has liberated the whole nation from the ideological constraints that were inherited from Mao...this shift from 'the end of ideology' to pragmatism is precisely the source for the ideological disorders existing in China today."²⁴

A list of other possible causes, such as the ignorance of cadres who saw no need for educating the young and therefore pocketed funds set aside for this purpose, or the lack of educational facilities due to the wide-scale destruction of the Cultural Revolution, or the one-child policy that has produced a generation of spoiled "little emperors" who are rejecting the traditional values of self-mastery and self-discipline, all these were raised by a few educationalist²⁵ but they received little attention and no practical consideration at the time.

The BSSC was, finally, a response to the "loss of ideological and moral values". And this situation came about not because of a lack of schooling, but rather from a failure of faith in the CCP. Communist ideals and socialistic values fell before the mighty onslaught of pragmatism brought about by the economic reforms, and by the influence of foreign ideas flooding into the country from the open door policy. A new ideology was needed and BSSC was launched to meet that need. People were now to be judged good or bad not according to traditional ethical norms but according to whether or not they adhered to the Party line. Those who did not offer their full co-operation, indeed, were many, and the authorities were quick to hold them responsible for the serious "moral crisis" among the masses. In this way the authorities shifted the blame from the CCP onto these who were judged to be the "destabilising elements" and "criminals" of society.

This way of analyzing the problem of China's present moral crisis had a great influence on the choice of remedies to be taken, and on the way in which the BSSC would be implemented in practice.

In dealing with the problem-behavior of the "criminals", remedies ranged from severe physical punishments and heavy fines, to preventative measures adopted to discourage individual dissent or social protest movements. In dealing with "the loss of correct ideology", the authorities advocated "socialist education" and Marxist indoctrination. Various other

"educational" measures were taken, including new legislation, massive moral educational campaigns, and the promotion of role-models.

Efforts at providing appropriate new legislation have run into difficulties in the area of enforcement.²⁶ Many cadres are reluctant to enforce the laws, some do not understand them, while still others do not even know of their existence.

The moral education campaigns tend to direct their attention to the youth, the last one focused on nationalism and patriotism as an appropriate ideology justifying the central role of the Party without compromising any tenets of the communist creed.

Traditional virtues, the moral and religious values of the past, especially those of the Confucian tradition and the major organized religious, have all been revived, solicited, and given a new place in the BSSC, but not, naturally enough, without grave reservations on the part of many of the leading cadres, who come from a background of militant atheism and materialism.

The promotion of role-models has been given a strong emphasis. The product is sold with all the pomp and circumstances that political leadership can muster. Television specials, books, liturgies and ceremonies at the Great Hall of the People, all are part of the machinery used to churn out worthy role-models for the masses to honor and emulate. The State is able to do this sort of thing quite efficiently.²⁷

A stable social order demands, say the authorities, that they impose their standards of morality on the people. And they are the sole interpreters of what constitutes "socialism with Chinese characteristics." This is done, however, not without serious conflicts, since the state moves, at times, against traditional habits or moral principles other than those promoted by the government. Some of the more sensitive values include: the proper exercise of authority; initiating democratic forms of management in government and the work place, degrees of regional autonomy, and the large area of human rights and liberties. The government tends to intervene with a heavy hand against those whom it considers transgressors and therefore "criminals". But for other moral issues they show little or no concern at all, such as divorce, concubinage, and homosexuality, since they consider none of these problematic in maintaining stability and order at the present time.

The efforts of the Chinese authorities to promote the BSSC are worthy of high praise. However, their main motivation in all of this seems to be a

concern for the fate of the CCP. The dual concern to promote economic modernization on the one hand, and to ensure ideological purity on the other, at times reduces the BSSC to the level of a mere tool in the stabilization process. Little regard is given to an analysis of the value of the BSSC in and for itself, while much attention is paid to its use for political motivation. And this could end up quite tragically, in a contradiction of immense ironic proportions, for how can the CCP, if itself riddled by corruption, make credible to the masses any exhortation to resolve the moral crisis, or how can it seek to impose any ideological values on the people without sounding crass and hollow?

Endnotes

¹ He Fangyao, a researcher of the Academy of Social Sciences of Guangzhou, *Zongjiao dui minzhu wenhua suzhide yingxiang* (Influence of religion on the quality of the national culture), in *Zhexue Dongtai*, Dec. 30-31, 1994.

² Paragraph No. 37: the entire text of the speech was published by all the main Chinese newspapers on 9 October 1995. 'Building the socialist spiritual civilization' is the ordinary and obvious translation of the Chinese used in all the official documents in Chinese although, in English, in many cases, it is translated as 'building a socialist society with an advanced culture and ideology, or 'building socialist culture and ideology'

³ The National Administration of State Property recently reported that property worth 300 million yuan vanished each day (South China Morning Post, 13 October 1995).

⁴ According to the Liberation Army Daily, the changes of the valuation of money among the military personnel is manifested by the passion for comparing their income with others' ("After comparing, they often feel their incomes are too low and benefits poor, which influences their morale"), by a fondness for discussion of stock investment practices and other financial transactions, by the keen interest in acquiring business know-how and by an intense desire to work in an economic-related occupation (quoted in *Eastern Express*, 13 December 1994).

⁵ Quoted by *Eastern Express*, 27 January 1995.

⁶ Document of the State Council, 13 November, 1989, quoted in *A Glossary of Political Terms of the People's Republic of China*, K.S. Li, M. Lok, The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 1995, p. 246-47.

⁷ *Beijing Review*, 1986, No. 45, p.17.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Beijing Review*, April 13, 1981, p. 5.

¹⁰ *Beijing Review*, 1986, No. 45, p. 17.

¹¹ Two weeks later, the official media were speaking of 50,000 arrests, with the publication of red lists of criminals condemned to death, followed by public executions, in Beijing, Xi'an, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Guangzhou, etc. At the end of September, the official number of executions reached 2,000; in November, 5000, out of a total number of 80-100,000 arrests. In 1984, after one year of activity, the executions were estimated to be about 10,000.

¹² The Campaign was launched by the 2nd Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP on October 12, 1983 and it was planned to last three years. Its aim was to create a new contingent of Party members, ideological trustworthy persons who could support the new pragmatic line of the Party, by eliminating the old residual of extreme leftism and the new 'unhealthy tendencies'. The first stage planned for 1984, affected one million Party members employed in the central and provincial organs of the Party, government and army; the second stage was divided into two phases: the first one in 1985 involved eleven million members down to the district level, while the second phase for 1986 touched 36 million members in the rural areas. In May 1987, the Campaign was declared ended with a total of 150,000 members expelled from the Party, another 500,000 were punished for violations of party discipline.

¹³ The full Chinese text of the document was published by all dailies on 29 September 1986. The official English text was published in the *Beijing Review*, 1986, No. 40. It was published in booklet form by the Beijing Foreign Language Press under the full title *Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Guiding Principles for Building a Socialist Society with an Advanced Culture and Ideology*.

¹⁴ The Four Basic Principles are: Upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat, Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, Socialism and leadership of the CCP.

¹⁵ See Zhao Ziyang's report, *Advance Along the Road of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics*, in booklet form published by *Beijing Review*, 1987, No. 17: 33-162.

¹⁶ *The Challenge of Feudalist Forces in the Villages*, a report given by Wang Zhen, then vice-president of the Republic, to an internal meeting in February 1991, in which he warned that the nation's villages were in danger of being overrun by the forces of Western religion, capitalism and the resurgence of clan links; quoted in *China after Deng Xiaoping*, Wo-Lap Lam, P.A. Professional Consultants, Hong Kong, 1995, p. 153.

¹⁷ Willy Wo-Lap Lam, o.c., p. 157.

¹⁸ Quoted in *The Nineties*, May 1994, p. 40.

¹⁹ cf., Note 2.

²⁰ *South China Morning Post*, 23 October 1995.

²¹ Jasper Becker, "Confucius Pays the Price", in *South China Morning Post*, May 30, 1995.

²² A five-year official investigation found 4,700 cases of persons 'wrongly accused' of corruption (*Eastern Express*, 17 October 1995).

²³ *People's Daily*, 20 January 1995,

²⁴ Ting Wai, "Ideology and the Ethos Reform" in *China Review* 1994, M. Brosseau-Lo C.K., The Chinese Press, Hong Kong, 1994, p. 3,7.

²⁵ Professor Lou Yulie of the Beijing University quoted by *Asia Week*, Feb. 17, 1995, as saying: "In educating today's youth, we have neglected the personal mastery needed to evaluate ethical behavior correctly. One reason is that the country's one-child policy has produced a generation of 'little emperors' spoiled by doting parents and grandparents". The "Five Hearts" campaign (a loyal heart for the motherland, an affectionate heart for society, a caring heart for others, a filial heart for parents and a confident heart for oneself) recently started in a middle school in Jiamusi, Heilongjiang, spread to other schools on a voluntary and emotional basis (p. 28). About Chinese youth, see my article: "The Young in China's Families", Tripod, Vol. XIV, No. 81, May-June 1994, pp. 33-41.

²⁶ In August 1994, the Commission for Disciplinary Inspection announced that it was drafting the Regulations on Supervision within the Party and the Regulations on Disciplinary and Inspection Work in the Party, because corruption will worsen "unless there are well-defined laws, and unless the laws are enforced." A draft law to prevent abuses of government officials was examined by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in Oct. 1995. It was meant to insure a clean and honest government. On this list, Beijing and other provinces have promulgated legislation to supervise the local governments.

²⁷ To provide an alternative pantheon of heroes, the government has set up a hero production process. The China Foundation for Heroism Awards was established on 23 June 1993; with 'the sole purpose and aim of inspiring the whole society to carry forth and support social justice, public order and the general mood of the public' according to its secretary general, Zhou Shishan (*International Herald Tribune*, May 31, 1995).